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ABSTRACT
Moral rights give an artist personal rights to her work. Because an artist puts her personality,
spirit, and soul into the creation of her work, her honor and reputation may be harmed if her
works are mistreated. In 1990, the Visual Artists Rights Act incorporated moral rights into
U.S. copyright law. However, fair use became an absolute defense to moral rights violations.
This comment proposes that fair use should not be an absolute defense, and applies First
Amendment jurisprudence developed from defamation law to both fair use and moral rights.
Defamation shares similarities with both. Like moral rights, defamation law protects one's
reputation. In addition, the actual malice standard, which is derived from defamation law,
encourages public debate, which is similar to fair use. Fair use's purpose is to encourage the
dissemination of works that would otherwise be restrained by a copyright holder. By
analyzing how moral rights, fair use, and defamation's actual malice standard work together,
moral rights can prevail against fair use, without fair use being sacrificed.
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Good artistscopy. Great artistssteal1
-

Pablo Picasso

INTRODUCTION

Pablo Picasso is one of the most famous and important artists of the twentieth
century. 2 Guernica,3 arguably his most famous work, is a powerful painting that
screams the horrors of war by uniquely depicting the Nazi massacre at the Spanish
city of Guernica in 1937. 4 A mural of Guernica hangs at the entrance of the United
Nations Security Council chamber,5 but was infamously covered so its anti-war
message would not be viewed as hypocritical when Secretary of State Collin Powell
urged for the invasion of Iraq in February of 2003.6 Did this act dishonor Picasso's
reputation? What happens if a mural of Guernicais used by another artist, who is a
Neo-Nazi? What if this artist believes the Guernica massacre never happened and

* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The John Marshall Law School. B.S.E. Engineering Management,
Purdue University, May 2000. I would like to thank my editors Ian Botnick and Kirk Rowe. I would
like to point out their indefatigable and selfless efforts in helping me with this comment. In
addition, I would like to thank Dan Sullivan, P.J. McCarthy, and the editorial board of The John
Mars-hall Review of Intellectual Property Law for their support. A special thanks to Professors
Kevin Hopkins and Doris Long for their influence on this comment. Finally, thank you mom and
dad for all your support! Any mistakes in this article are my own.
I Jessica Lack, The Guide.* Exhibitions, Goshka Maeuga London, THE GUARDIAN, June 30,
2007, at 36.
2 See MARK STEVENS & ANNALYN SWAN, DE KOONING: AN AMERICAN MASTER 137-38, (2004)
(stating that Picasso spurred the Modern Art movement, is the father of cubism, and was a major
influence on American artists like William De Kooning).
GUERNICA (Pablo Picasso 1937), available at http://www.museoreinasofia.es/museoreinasofia
/live/coleccion/obras/guernica.html.
4 See Don Murray, Guernica, 70 Years Later. The Massacre That Prompted a Masterpiece,
CBC NEWS, Apr. 26, 2007, http://www.cbc.ca/news/reportsfromabroad/murray/20070426.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2008). Guernica is a city in the Basque region of Spain. Id. General Francsico
Franco during the Spanish Civil War allowed Nazi Germany to bomb the city as part of a military
exercise. Id. Casualties ranged from 300 to 1,000 civilians. Id.
5 Lawerence Van Gelder, Arts Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at E2. The United Nations
action was international news because it did not want to pollute what Guernicarepresents. Id.
6 Doree Shafrir, Artist Enlists Picasso in Fight Against War: He Suggests Using the 1937
Image Guernica to Make Statement About Iraq., ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 14, 2006, at E4; see also
Maureen Dowd, Powell Without Picasso,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at A27 (discussing how the U.N.
plans to prevent a mixed message by covering Guerniea, and its anti-war message, when Collin
Powell argues for the invasion of Iraq).
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writes the word "Lies" all over the mural? Should this artist's "new" work be
protected under the doctrine of fair use, or should Picasso's moral rights prevail?
Fair use allows an artist to comment on or criticize the work of another without
being liable for copyright infringement, 7 which serves as catalyst for the promotion of
the arts.8 Moral rights, on other hand, protect an artist's reputation and honor in her
own work, and allow her to participate in the marketplace of ideas without fear of
losing her individuality. 9 While both doctrines are important to artists, the policies
that underline fair use conflict with the interests that moral rights are designed to
protect. Currently, in the United States, the Copyright Act proscribes that fair use
will prevail over moral rights. 10
Fair use should not be an absolute defense. Society would be better served by a
more balanced approach to artists' rights. Accordingly, this comment explores the
application of the actual malice standard developed from defamation law to show
that moral rights and fair use can coexist.
Part I provides an overview of the history and the current law regarding moral
rights, fair use, defamation law and the constitutional standard of actual malice.
Part II analyzes the similarities between defamation law and moral rights, and
explores the issues that would arise with applying an actual malice standard to the
moral rights/fair use dichotomy. Part III proposes that such an application would be
feasible, even preferable, because of the similarities that moral rights and fair use
share with defamation law.

I.BACKGROUND
A. MoralRights
Moral rights are personal rights that protect an artist's investment in her work.
Specifically, under moral rights, the artist has the right to be attributed to her work
and to maintain the physical integrity of her works.11 Violations of these rights

7 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (promulgating the factors and uses that are considered in determining
if there is fair use).
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries."); see also JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 30 (2nd ed. 2006).
This is the Copyright and Patent clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. The word "science" under the
clause does not refer to patents. Id. The colonial interpretation of the word "science" means
knowledge and learning, thus copyrightable materials. Td. Consequently, the term "Useful arts"
refers to patents. Id.

9See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of MoralRight: A Study in the Law ofArtists, Authors
and Creators,53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 558 (1940). The right to create works is the "right of individual
liberty."
Id.
Historically, the right to create has been restrained through incarceration by
oppressive governments. Id.
10Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a). An artist's moral rights are "[s]ubject to [17
U.S.C. § 107]." Id; see id. § 107 ("Notwithstanding the provisions of sections [17 U.S.C. §§ 106106A], the fair use of a copyrighted work... is not an infringement of copyright").
11See Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking the Compatiblityof MoralRights and Fair Use, 54 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 33, 39(1997) ("While there are considerable differences among the particular moral
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damage the artist's honor or reputation. The following section discusses the
development of moral rights and highlights the importance of protecting these rights.

1. The Originsand Essence ofMoral Rights.
The birthplace of moral rights, or droit moral a2 is 19th century France. 13 As
stated, moral rights give artists personal rights to their work. 14 France and other
civil law countries 15 believe the artist puts her personality, spirit, and soul into the
creation process, which is radiated in the final work. 16 Essentially, moral rights
allow an artist to safeguard her work from becoming an inaccurate reflection of her
personality or soul.
Consequently, several moral rights developed from this
underlying theory of protection, including: (i) the right of integrity;1 7 (2) the right of
attribution;1 8 and (3) the right to withhold (withdrawal).19
The right of integrity protects the artist's work as a whole and prevents any
mutilation, distortion, or altering of the work.20 This allows
the work to be presented
in a manner consistent with the artist's personality.2 1 Otherwise, any alteration
amputates the artist's personality from the work and, thus, harms her reputation
and honor.2 2 Indeed, the artist would have to go through the agony of seeing her
2 3
work dismembered.
rights recognized in different jurisdictions, the most commonly recognized are the right of
attribution and the right of integrity.").
12 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01[A] (2007).
Nimmer states that the notion of a spiritual or personal right included in droit moral is lost in the
English translation. Id. Another French translation is that it means a non-economic right. Id.
Nimmer also warns that "moral rights" should not be interpreted as something that involves the
moral judgment of right or wrong, or good and evil. Id.
13 Illhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright,58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795,
803 (2001).
1 NIMMER, supra note 12, § 8D.01.
15 See RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESSLER, ART LAW:
THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS,
INVESTORS, DEALERS & ARTISTS 1252-54 (3d ed. 2005) (specifying the moral rights protected in
Germany, Italy, and Spain).
16Lee, supra note 13, at 801.
17 John Henry Merryman, The Refrirerator of Bernard Buffet, HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1027
(1976).
18Id. Also known as the right of paternity in other countries. Id.
Id. at 1028. This is also known as the right of divulgation. Id.
Ciolino, supra note 11, at 40.
21 Id.at 41.
22 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, ALBERT E. ELSEN & STEPHEN K. URICE, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE
VISUAL ARTS 423 (5th ed. 2007).
Professor Merryman states a violation of this right is a
mistreatment of the artist's personality. Id. Personality encompasses one's identity, name,
reputation, occupation, privacy, honor and in essence one's person. Merryman, supra note 17, at
1025.
23 Lee, supra note 13, at 815. It has been argued it protects the author's personality interest in
the creative process by preventing the "agony" of seeing their work altered in a different manner.
Id. However, the complete destruction of a work may not violate the right to integrity. Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the MoralRight: Is an American MarriagePossible? 38 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1985). This is because when a work is altered, it is presented in a form that is not her
own and generates criticism for a work she has not created. Roeder, supra note 9, at 569. In
19
20
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The right of attribution allows an artist to be identified with her work. 24
Similarly, the artist also has the right not to associate her name with her art if she
25
wishes; the artist may attribute her work anonymously or with a pseudonym.
Furthermore, the right allows an artist to refrain from being associated with a work
that is not hers. 26 As a result, this further protects an artist's reputation and
reaffirms the notion that her personality is encompassed in her work. 27 Lastly, the
right of attribution prohibits a low quality work from being associated with the artist
28
and, thus, prevents the artist's reputation from being diluted.
The right to withdrawal, or withhold, allows an artist to withdraw his work from
29
the public, or prevent the work from even entering the public realm, respectively.
This gives the artist the right to dictate the time, place, and manner on how her work
will be seen by public, even if it is to be displayed or seen at all.3 0 This allows for the
31
artist to control some of her work's criticisms and helps shield her reputation.
Additionally, this right gives an artist more power in protecting her personality or
persona.3 2 Indeed, when a work no longer reflects who the artist is, it can be
33
removed from the public.
Historically, moral rights encompass the right of integrity, the right of
attribution, and the right to withhold. 34 These rights are important to an artist
because it preserves the artist's honor, reputation, and personality. Moreover, these
35
rights ensure the artist's message will be conveyed to the public as intended.
36
Accordingly, moral rights embrace First Amendment principles.
contrast, destruction of a work cannot generate criticism because a destroyed work can no longer be
displayed. Id. Accordingly, an additional policy issue for the right of integrity is the public's right to
having a work fully preserved. Merryman, supra note 22, at 423.
24 W.W. Kowalski, A Comparative Law Analysis of the Retained Rights ofArtists, 38 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1141, 1158 (2005). An example of this pertained to a French artist who was
commissioned to produce several works of arts, and in his contract he was suppose to sign the works
with a pseudonym and not his own. Id.
25 Lee, supra note 13, at 802.
26 Ciolino, supra note 11, at 40.
27 See Merryman, supra note 22, at 423.
All other moral rights do not have an economic
incentive. Id. This right is important because the professional reputation of an artist is critical for
an artist to be lucrative in the art market. Id.
28 See Roeder, supra note 9, at 563 (stating such tactics are unfair competition).
29 See Kowalski, supra note 24, at 1160, 1161.
'3 Id. at 1160. This right is based on the fact the artist is the only person who knows when the
work is done. Id.
31 See id. at 1161. Consequently, and artist may withdraw a work that is not well received to
prevent further damage to her reputation.
32

See id.

33 See id. An artist may withdraw a work from the public when the work not longer expresses

the artist's opinions. Id.
34 See Merryman, supra note 17, at 1027-28 (using three cases from French law to highlight
the historical importance of these rights).
'35 See id. at 1029. The artist's vision is best served when her work is protected and kept it the
same state it emerged from.
36 Cf Justin Hughes, The PhilosophyofIntellectual Property,77 GEO. L.J. 287, 358-61 (1988).
Copyright protection, it has been argued, should have First Amendment protection because freedom
ofexpression is meaningless without assurancesthat the expression will remain unadulterated.Id.
at 359. In addition, moral rights are implicated with this argument. Id. Accordingly, "free speech
requires that speech be guaranteed some integrity. It follows that if intellectual property is
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2. Moral Rights in the United States - Before the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
Moral rights did not exist in America until the United States joined the Berne
Convention in 1988.37 However, this did not prevent moral rights claims from being
made prior to joining.
In New York, for example, some professionals brought libel claims against
publishers who attributed to them to works they did not write or edit.38 These
actions resembled moral rights claims and suggested that moral rights were
protected in some form by the American legal system. Rulings favorable to the
authors' seemed to suggest that moral rights were protected in America. However,
the courts relied more on a theory of publishing false statements rather than
misattribution in determining reputational harm and, thus, masked any formal
adoption of moral rights. 39 Similar pre-Berne claims were also brought under the
Lanham Act. 40 While these claims resembled, and even discussed, moral rights, the
expression, it merits the same guarantee." Id. Further, if free speech's goals are the promotion of
political debate or market efficiency, then it is critical the speaker's message is not distorted, or the
goals become significantly hindered. Id. at 360. Moreover, expression must be protected for those
who cannot overcome such distortions. Id. For example, public officials or figures can overcome
such alterations because their positions allow them to clarify their expressions through the media or
other channels. Id. Justice Brennan articulated this position:
[I]n the absence of an effective means of communication, the right to speak would
ring hollow indeed. And, in recognition of these principles, we have consistently
held that the First Amendment embodies, not only the abstract right to be free
from censorship, but also the right of an individual to utilize an appropriate and
effective medium for the expression of his views.
Id. at 361 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 193 (1973)
(Brennan J., dissenting)).
'37Lee, supra note 13, at 805 (noting that the United States initially joined through the Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988); see Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works art. 6bis, adopted Sept. 9, 1886, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 ("[An]
author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion,
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which
would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation."); see also David M. Spector, Implieations of United
States Adherence to the Berne Convention, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 100, 105 (1989) (stating Berne's purpose
was to unify international copyright law and fight piracy).
38 See, e.g., Clevenger v. Baker Voohris & Co., 168 N.E.2d 643, 644 (N.Y. 1960) (regarding
Joseph Clevenger, the renowned author on New York state law, bringing suit against his former
publishers for continuing to use his name on a treatise he no longer edited); Ben-Oliel v. Press Pub.
Co., 167 N.E. 432, 432 (N.Y. 1929) (regarding, a newspaper that published an article the plaintiff did
not write and attributed her as the author); Gershwin v. Ethical Publ'g Co., Inc., 1 N.Y.S.2d 904, 905
(N.Y. City Ct. 1937) (regarding a case where Ethical Publishing printed an advertisement that had
Dr. Gershwin endorsing a medicinal drug).
'39See, e.g., Clevenger, at 168 N.E.2d at 644-45, 646 (noting that there were over 200 errors
that consisted of omitted citations, misapplied annotations, and mis-described amendments which
harmed Clevenger's reputation); Ben-Olie, at 167 N.E. at 433 (holding that an article which
attributed opinions to the plaintiff which she did not hold and blatantly misstated facts was
libelous).
10 See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14, 19, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that
Monty Python could sustain a Lanham Act violation when it did not want to be associated with an
overly edited broadcast of its sketch because it hurt the group's reputation in America and,
therefore, entitled it to protection); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1980) (involving an
actor's performance in a movie being credited to another person, an act the court believed harmed
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courts never recognized these claims as a moral rights violation. 41 Collectively, these
cases show that the idea of moral rights was prevalent in the American justice
system even before it was formally accepted in 1988.

3. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
The Berne Convention's particular article dealing with morals rights was not
treated as self-executory, meaning the moral rights provisions were not incorporated
into U.S. law when the treaty was ratified. 42 Instead, Berne allows for modification
before its execution. 43 Subsequently, Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990 ("VARA"), which has been incorporated into the Copyright Act as a result of
44
joining Berne.
VARA is similar to Berne in that it grants both the right of attribution 45 and
integrity. 46 The right of attribution under VARA, however, not only gives the artist
47
the right to associate her name with her work, but also grants two negative rights:
(1) the right to prevent attribution to any visual work the artist did not create; 48 and
(2) the right to disassociate from distorted, mutilated, or modified works that result
in prejudicial harm to the artist's honor or reputation. 49 Honor 50 is defined as "[one's]
good name or public esteem," and reputation 51 means an artist's worth or merit.
Similar to Berne, VARA's integrity right5 2 is violated when a visual work is
mutilated, distorted or modified and causes prejudice to an artist's honor or
the actor's reputation because it could prevent him from receiving future work do to the mis-credit
and, therefore, allowed the actor to maintain a Lanham Act claim).
41 See Gifliam, 538 F.2d at 24. The court discussed moral rights, however it stated those rights
were not recognized by U.S. law. Id. at 24-25.
42 See NIMMER, supra note 12,

§ 8D.02[C].

Self-executory means the United States would have

to follow Article 6bis strictly.
13 Id.; see also Berne Convention, supra note 37 ("The means of redress for safeguarding the
rights granted by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is
claimed.").
41See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2006) ("Rights of attribution and integrity [are s]ubject to section of
the exclusive rights provided in section 106.").
45 Id. §§ 106A(a)(1)(A)-(B) (granting the creator of a work the right to claim authorship to
works she has created and the right to prevent any misuse of her name that is associated with
works she did not create).
46 Id. §§ 106A(a)(1)-(3). An author has the right to protect the integrity of her work. Id.
47 See NIMMER, supra note 12, § 8D.06[B][1] (stating that these negative rights would most
likely be the ones asserted).
48 Id. § 106A(a)(1)(B) ("T]o prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of
visual art which he or she did not create").
49 Id. § 106A(a)(2) ("[An author] shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as
the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of
the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.").
50 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 861 F. Supp. 303, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd in part,revd in part
on other grounds, vacated in parton other grounds, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir.) (using this definition was
not against the purpose of VARA).
51 Id. (emphasizing the definition was not against the purpose of VARA).
52 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A). This section states that VARA is "to prevent any intentional
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her
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reputation. 53 In contrast to Berne, the right of integrity allows an artist to prevent or
54
recover damages from a work that is destroyed.
VARA, in general, is more limited than Berne because it only applies to certain
visual arts, whereas Berne applies to all literary and visual works. 55 Accordingly, the
ability to make a moral rights claim under VARA is significantly hindered.
VARA imposes several limitations on moral rights. Moral rights are subject to
fair use, 56 and are independent of the rights granted by copyright. 57 Only the
creator 58 of an artwork attains moral rights. 59 These rights can be waived but cannot

honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a
violation of that right." Id. The same definitions for prejudice, honor, and reputation also apply to
this right. Id.; see also Carter,861 F. Supp. at 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying terms apply the same
to both the right of integrity and the right of attribution).
53 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
51Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B) ('[The author of a work shall have the right] to prevent any destruction of
a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a
violation of that right.").
55 Compare id. § 101 (narrowly defining visual arts), with Berne Convention, supra 37, art. 2
("The expression 'literary and artistic works' shall include every production in the literary, scientific
and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression."). The Copyright Act
defines a "work of visual art" as:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated
sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and
bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a
single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or
fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
17 U.S.C. § 101. However, "a work of visual art does not include:"
(A) (i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied
art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper,
periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or
similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or
packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);

(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
Id.
56 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) ("Rights of attribution and integrity... [are] subject to [17 U.S.C.
§ 107].").
57Id. ("Rights of attribution and integrity ... [are] independent of the exclusive rights provided
in [17 U.S.C. § 1061.").
5s See id. § 101 (defining that an author cannot retain any moral rights when her work was
created as a work for hire).
59Id. § 106A(e)(2). Moral rights are distinct from the copyright owner. Id. If a copyright is
transferred from an author to another it does not transfer, or waive, the author's moral rights. Id.
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be transferred to another. 60 Finally, moral rights only last for the life of the author if
61
created after the enactment of VARA, otherwise for the duration of the copyright.
While incorporation of moral rights into copyright law is not a novel concept, it
was not until the adoption of VARA that the incorporation formally took place. As a
result, the honor and reputation of American artists can now be better protected.
Furthermore, the public's interest in preserving a work's original expression can also
62
be protected.

B. FairUse
63
The doctrine of fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement
and, therefore, to moral rights. 64 It is important to understand the policies of fair use
because fair use is a statutory defense, which cannot be neglected. The following
section discusses the policies and features of fair use.
Fair use recognizes the public's interest in the dissemination of information and
balances that interest against a copyright owner's right to control her work. 65 A good
illustration of this was when the reclusive Howard Hughes moved for a preliminary
66
The
injunction against the publishers of an unflattering biography about him.
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated the fair use doctrine
protected the publisher's use of the material. 67 The public's interest in the
information outweighed Hughes's copyright interest because Hughes was
68
newsworthy and the biography disseminated information on a public figure.

(3oId. § 106A(e)(1).

This section states that moral rights cannot be transferred, and that moral

rights can only be waived if it is expressed in a written instrument. Id. This instrument has to also
expressly mention the work. Id. Additionally, moral rights are waived for joint authors when one
author chooses to do so. Id.
(31ITd. § 106A(d) (stating that authors who created works before VARA have moral rights that
last as long as the copyright, and artists that created works afterwards only have a moral rights for
the duration of her life).
(32See Hughes, supra note 36, at 359 (stating when speech is distorted the democratic process
is hindered).
(33See Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) ("The burden of
proof is on the copier because fair use is an affirmative defense .... " (citing Campbell v. Acruff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994))).
(3417 U.S.C. § 107 ("Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A [the rights
granted

to copyright holders,

and VARA, respectively] ...

fair use ...

is

not infringement of

copyright.").
(3'See NIMMER, supra note 12, § 19E.02[A][1] (emphasizing fair use is vital "for the creation
and maintenance of a robust public discourse"); see also Chi. Bd. of Edue., 354 F.3d at 628. The
court stated one purpose of fair use is to "facilitate criticism of copyrighted works by enabling the
critic to quote enough of the criticized work to make his criticisms intelligible." Id. Furthermore,
the court should not use copyright to stifle criticism. Id.
66 Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 1966). Howard
Hughes was alerted to an upcoming release of a biography about him that would make "trouble" for
him. Id. Therefore, Hughes bought the copyrights of magazine articles about him from the 1950s
and then moved for a preliminary injunction a few days later. Id.
(37Id. at 304.
(G8
Id. at 309 ("Thus, in balancing the equities at this time in our opinion the public interest
should prevail over the possible damage to the copyright owner.").
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The Copyright Act states that appropriate uses for fair use include: criticism,
commentary, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. 69 However, these
uses are not exhaustive. 70 Accordingly, the Copyright Act gives four factors to be
used in determining if a use is fair. 71 There can be other considerations in addition to
these four factors. 72
One such consideration is whether the defendant's actions constitute good
faith. 73
This idea was brought up in Harper & Rowe Publishers v. Nation
Enterprises,74 which held "Iflair use presupposes 'good faith' and 'fair dealing."'
However, in Campbell v. Aeruff-Rose Musie, Inc., 75 the Supreme Court implied that
good faith should be only a small consideration. 76 In Campbell, the rap group, 2 Live
Crew, created a parody of Roy Orbison's song Pretty Woman.77 The plaintiff argued
the group's state of mind should be considered because the group acted in bad faith.'8
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and stated that even absent good faith,
the rap group's actions still indicated a fair use because there was no threat of harm
to the market value of Orbison's work. 79 Hence, Campbellwas the first step in the
retreat from having good faith being central to a fair use analysis.
The debate regarding the defendant's state of mind did not end with Campbell.
In NXIVM Corp v. Ross Institute,80 the defendant gained access to the plaintiffs

69 17 U.S.C. § 107 ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright.").
70 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447 (1984). The
fair use was whether home VCR recording was legitimate. Id. The court defined "time-shifting" as
"the practice of recording a program to view it once at a later time, and thereafter erasing it." Id. at
423. The Court held time-shifting was a fair use. Id. at 454-55.
71 17 U.S.C. § 107. The four factors being:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
Id. These factors must be "explored together" in deciding fair use, and are not elemental. Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (stating that the four factors used in determining
fair use "must be explored together, and not in isolation").
72 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (stating the four given fair use factors shall be included in a fair use
determination); Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 740 (2d Cir. 1991). The court stated
that fair use is to be determined by the totality of the circumstances and facts of the case. Id.
Moreover, it could be possible for a party to be "shut-out" by the four factors and still prevail on fair
use. Id.
73 Harper & Rowe Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
74 Id
75 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
76 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585 n.18. The Court implies that good faith is not central to fair
use by stating "[e]ven if good faith were central to fair use." Id.
77 Id. at 571.
78 Id. at 575 n.18.
79
Seeid. at 575 n.18, 593-94.
80 364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004).
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seminar materials and posted a portion of them on its website.8 1 The majority
equated the defendant's actions to misappropriation done in bad faith.8 2 Accordingly,
the court suggested that bad faith is relevant in determining fair use.8 3 Despite this
being the case, the majority held the use was fair because the other factors still
indicated fair use.8 4 The court took a narrow approach in considering bad faith, and
stated bad faith should not be weighed heavily.8 5 As a result, good faith cannot be
86
central to a fair use analysis, thus reaffirming Campbell.
The concurring opinion, however, stated it was wrong for the majority to even
consider the defendant's conduct.87 Judge Jacobs believed the defendant's morality
and state of mind should not have had any bearing on fair use because copyright law
does not deal with virtue.88 Rather, Judge Jacobs believed that considering a
defendant's state of mind would deter authors from creating new works because they
89
would not want to deal with the burden of proving their benevolent state of mind.
Overall, fair use is important in copyright law because it benefits the public by
allowing information and ideas to flow freely. Accordingly, the doctrine of fair use
cannot, and should not, be discounted when a moral rights claim has been made.

C. Defamation in General,Libel in Particular
The main goal of defamation law is to protect an individual's reputation. 90 The
underlying policies behind defamation law are similar to those of moral rights.
81Id.at 475.
82 Id.at 477, 478.
83 Id. at 478.
81Id.at 477.
85Id.at 478 ("we read Harper& Row§ holding more narrowly").
86 Id. at 479 ("a finding of bad faith is not to be weighed very heavily within the first fair use
factor and cannot be made central to fair use analysis").
87 Id. at 483 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) ("Copyright itself would be distorted if its contours were
made to depend on the morality and good behavior of secondary users.").
88 Id. at 485.
The dissents states:
"[C]opyright is not about virtue; it is about the
encouragement of creative output, including the output of transformative quotation. Its goals are
not advanced if bad faith can defeat a fair use defense." Id.
89 Id.at 486. The goals of copyright are to derive benefits to the public. Id. Moreover, "the fair
use defense exist to further these same goals". Id.
90 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966). The majority stressed there is a "pervasive and
strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation." Id. Moreover, emphasizing
the protection of a reputation may be a fundamental right, because "t]he right of a man to the
protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than
our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of
any decent system of ordered liberty." Id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see
Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 793 n.16 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging "the individual's interest in reputation is certainly at the core of notions
of human dignity") (citation omitted). But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976) (holding
that reputation was neither a liberty or property right, hence a state deprivation of one's reputation
was not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause); see also Christina Bohannan

& Thomas F. Cotter, When the State Steals Ideas: Is the Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity
From FederalInfringement Claims ConstitutionalinLight ofSeminole Tribe ?,67 FORDHAM L. REV.
1435, 1507-08 (1999) (discussing intellectual property rights based on reputation "might be
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However, defamation law is steeped in the tradition of the common law and has been
more legally developed. 91 From this development, First Amendment considerations
have been applied to defamation. As a result, an actual malice standard has been
applied for the promotion of public debate. Thus, the following section introduces
defamation law, and discusses the actual malice standard.

1. Libel Under the Common Law
Defamation includes libel and slander. 92 The principle difference between the
two is libel involves the publication of defamatory statements, whereas slander
involves oral statements. 93 Accordingly, only libel is relevant to this discussion
94
because libel law deals with fixed communication.
The common law elements 95 of libel are: (1) the publication 96 of a statement
that; (2) is false; 97 (3) is defamatory; and (4) is "of and concerning" the aggrieved
party. Indeed, even opinions may be libelous. 98 However, an exaggeration or mere
hyperbole may not be actionable because such obvious statements cannot reasonably
be taken as truthful. 99

2. The Relationship between Visual Arts and Libel
In general, libel causes of actions are not applicable to visual works. The best
known case that highlights this is Silberman v. Georges.100 In Silberman, Georges,
the accused artist, painted a symbolic allegory that included three men, resembling

protected under a substantive due process theory"). See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 590-615 (1997) (arguing reputation is a
fundamental property right and deserves constitutional protection).
91See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 400-01 (2000).
9
2VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE AND
SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 851 (11th ed. 2005).
93 Id.
94 Id.

(including "pictures, signs, statues, motion pictures and the like").
Id. § 401. Some jurisdictions may include the following elements: some degree of fault on
the publisher, or actual damages instead of presumed damages. Id.
96 Td. § 402. Publication occurs when one or more parties can understand the statements at
issue. Id. This makes the term "publication" a legal term of art, and should understood as such in
defamation cases. Id.
97 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
There is no value in protecting a false
statement that purports untrue facts. Id. The Court noted even there is "no constitutional value in
false statements of fact." Id.
98 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (holding opinions that imply false
facts can be actionable for defamation).
9 Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (declaring the description
of an official's negotiation tactics as "blackmail" could not be taken literally, or truthfully, even by
the most careless reader).
10091 A.D.2d 520 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). The painting was called The Mugging of the Muse and
was an attack on the plaintiffs' views on art. Id. The plaintiffs were former colleagues of the
defendant and were well known artists. Id.
9
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the plaintiffs, mugging the goddess Muse. 10 1 The painting also contained a cherub
and a fire hydrant spewing blood.102 The court held that the painting's interpretation
was speculative. The work had several different meanings, some of which were not
false statements. 10 3 Thus, the court did not apply the principles of libel law to the
10 4
painting and did not hold Georges liable.
Cort v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Companies, Inc. 10 5 is another
example of a case illustrating the relationship, or lack thereof, between a libel cause
of action and a visual work. 10 6 There, a new owner of a building sprayed a mural
with an opaque sealant to prevent leaks and, consequently, covered the mural
completely. 10 7 The libel claim turned on whether the destruction of the painting was
a false statement. The Ninth Circuit held that the destruction conveyed at least two
potential messages, neither of which could have been construed to be false. To those
people who knew of the mural's existence, the message communicated was that the
new owners did care enough about the mural to refrain from covering it.108
Alternatively, to those who did not know of the murals existence, no message was
communicated at all. 10 9 Similar to Silberman, this court stated that the visual work
was subject to multiple meanings and, therefore, was not sufficient to sustain a libel
cause of action. 110 These two cases illustrate the obstacles an artist faces when
trying to bring a moral rights claim under libel law.

3. The 'Actual Malice"Standard
Historically, the right to free speech was never a factor in defamation cases.111
Thus, the First Amendment could not be a defense in libel. Under the old strict
liability standard, a defendant would automatically be found liable if he could not
prove that the statements at issue were true. 112 This included political speech.
Consequently, common law defamation restrained speech on public issues or officials
101 Id.at 520-21. The painting was called The Mugging of the Muse and was an attack on the
plaintiffs' views on art. Id. The plaintiffs were former colleagues of the defendant and were well
known artists. Id.; see Harriette K. Dorsen & Colleen McHahon, Art as Libel: A Comment on
Silberman v. Georges, 9 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (1984) (researching when Georges displayed the
painting during a slide show that the audience began to laugh because of the resemblance of the
plaintiffs).
102 Silberman,91 A.D.2d, at 521.
103 See id. (discussing a few meanings the painting had and holding it was not reasonable to
believe the plaintiffs actually committed assault).
104

Id. at 521-22.

105 311 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2002).
106 Id. at 986.
107

Id.at 982.

Id. at 986. The court stated this message "would have been insulting to the artists, but it
would have been true." Id.
108

109 Id.

I1 Id.

See DOBBS, supra 91, § 417 (stating that in 1964, the Supreme Court recognized the First
Amendment's free speech provisions imposed limits on the common law strict liability).
112 Id. § 410. The common law recognizes "truth as an affirmative defense with the burden
upon the defendant to prove it." Additionally, only "substantial truth" is needed for the defense. Id.
III
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because the defendant's burden of proof was, at times, too difficult to prove-even
when his statements were in fact truthful. 113 Hence, a speaker fearful of a lawsuit
114
may withhold truthful statements, even to society's detriment.
This all changed in the landmark Supreme Court case, New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.11 5 The Court there abolished the application of strict liability to statements
concerning public officials and applied the actual malice standard. 116 The actual
malice standard shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff by requiring him to prove
the speaker believed the statement at issue was false by clear and convincing
118
evidence.1 17 This standard was later applied to public officials as well.

113See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) ("W]ould-be critics of official
conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even
though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of
having to do so").
114 Id.
(emphasizing speakers who cannot prove truth would "make only statements which
'steer far wider of the unlawful zone') (citation omitted).
115 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This case involved a full page advertisement ran by the N.Y Times,
entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices." Id. at 256. The advertisement was to bring awareness to the
civil rights movement in the south, particularly Montgomery, Alabama. Id. The advertisement
purported a "wave of terror" for those involved in the movement, including Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. Id. at 257. The advertisement included some misstatement of facts involving King. Id. at 258,
259. The advertisement stated Dr. King, was arrested seven times for trivial offenses, but charged
him for felonies, which the authorities tried to imprison him for ten years. Id. at 257-58, 259. It
was clear, the Court said, that some of these statements were not true, or even took place in
Montgomery. Id. at 258. Also, included in the advertisement were 64 names or people widely
known to be involved with these incidents against Dr. King and the movement. Id. at 257. Sullivan,
was the Commissioner of Public Affairs in Montgomery, and he felt his reputation was harmed by
the misstatements. Id. at 256. In analyzing the situation, Justice Brennan understood that the civil
rights movement was one of the "major public issues of our time," and deserved constitutional
protection. Id. at 271. Thus, the Court weighed whether such issues deserve constitutional
protections, and if they did so, did they lose out to a public official claiming defamation. Id. Justice
Brennan, and the majority, gave careful consideration with the issues at hand, and enunciated one
of the most endearing statements about the First Amendment, which is: "debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id. at 270; see also
Thurgood Marshall, A Tribute to Justice William J Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990).
Justice Marshall recalls the importance of Justice Brennan's historic opinion by giving the First
Amendment the "breathing space" it "need[s] to survive." Id. (quoting N Y Times, 376 U.S. at 486);
Abner J. Milka, A Tribute To Justice William J Brennan, Jr., 104 HARv. L. REV. 9, 10-11 (1990).
Chief Judge Milka recalls Justice Brennan believed N. Y Times was his most important decision in
his thirty four years as a Supreme Court Justice. Id.
116 N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 279 ("The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal
rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice').
117 Harte-Hanks Commc'n v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 659 (1989) ("A public figure may not
recover damages for a defamatory falsehood without clear and convincing proof that the false
statement was made with "actual malice ).
118Curtis Publg Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) ("[A] 'public figure' who is not a public
official may also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial
danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct .. "). The standard,
to determine unreasonable conduct was the actual malice standard. Harte-Hanks Commcn, 491
U.S. at 659.
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"Actual malice" is a legal term of art. 119 To rise to the level of actual malice, a
speaker must make statements that are knowingly false or made with reckless
disregard for the truth to be held liable under this standard. 120 "Knowingly false"
occurs when a speaker makes a statement with a "high degree of awareness
of... probable falsity." 121 For a statement to be considered reckless, the speaker
must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement. 122 Despite the
123
term malice, it is not necessary to show any ill will or enmity.
Unlike most areas of tort law, the standard for actual malice is subjective to
what the speaker actually thought. 124 This is a stark difference to the objective
standard, where the analysis is based on what the "reasonable man" would have
thought. 125 The actual malice standard evaluates the actual speaker's state of
mind. 126 Admittedly, this makes it harder for a public figure or official to recover on
libel claims because the burden is on them. 127
Nonetheless, the actual malice
standard is needed for the encouragement of debate on public people.
The actual malice standard encourages public debate while remaining fair to
public figures. Public officials or figures know they will be subjected to criticism that
may be defamatory. 128 Furthermore, these public figures have greater media access,
allowing them to protect their reputations by using the proper channels to refute any
unfavorable statements. 129 Therefore, a higher burden is more than reasonable to all
parties.
Because the actual malice standard shifts the burden of proof to the public
person, it is essential to know who is viewed as a public person under the law. A
public official is any government employee who has substantial responsibility in

11) See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1964). The Court defined what the term
"actual malice" meant, by citing NY Times. d.
It ruled "actual malice" only means the false
statements were made with "knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard of whether they are
true or false." Id. at 78. Consequently, "hatred, ill will or enmity or a wanton desire to injure ...
has no bearing in determining the falsity of statement. -d. at 77-78 (citations omitted).

120 NY Times Co., 376 U.S. at 280 (holding a statement is made with actual malice when the
speaker made it with "knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not").
121 See Garrison,379 U.S. at 74.

122 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (stating, "recklessness" is when the
defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication).
123 See Garrison,379 U.S. at 77-78 (highlighting this distinction); see supra text accompanying
note 119.
124 St.Amant, 390 U.S. at 731 ("There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that
the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.").
125 Id. ("These cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably
prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing.").
126 Id.

127 See id. (Concededly

the reckless disregard standard may permit recovery in fewer

situations than would a rule that publishers must satisfy the standard of the reasonable man or the
prudent publisher").
128 C. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342. (1974) (implicating public figures seek
the public's attention thus the actual malice standard should apply).
129 Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967).
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government affairs. 130 A public figure is a person, or organization, 13 1 that has
attained a prominent status in society. There are two types of public figures: the allpurpose public figure and the limited-purpose public figure. 13 2 An all-purpose public
figure is someone who has either "pervasive power or influence," or "pervasive fame
or notoriety" in public affairs. 133 Limited public figures are those who have
voluntarily thrusted themselves 13 4 or have been drawn into a particular
controversy. 135 A limited purpose public figure can arise also where a person
knowingly receives unfair criticism by entering the public arena. 13 6 The actual
malice standard is applied to both types of public figures, but it is important to
recognize this distinction because an artist will most likely be a limited public figure
when she makes a moral rights claim. 137

4. The Application ofActual Malice to Other Areas of Tort Law
In addition to defamation, the actual malice standard has also been exported to
other areas of tort law. In Time Inc. v. Hi, 138 the Supreme Court applied the actual
malice standard to false light causes of action. 13 9 A false light tort occurs when a
person is placed in a false light in a manner that a reasonable person would find
offensive. 140 Life magazine (owned by Time) wrote an article involving the Hill
130 See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (stating a "'public official' designation applies
at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the
public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.").
131See generallyDOBBS, supra 91, § 418. (listing that organizations such as businesses, public
interests groups, charities, and religious organizations may qualify as a public figure).
132 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. This is because certain public figures may be involved in a wide
range of public issues, or just from fame or notoriety is a public figure for "all purposes and in all
contexts." Id. Other public figures are involved in a "limited" range of issues, but still hold a special
prominence in the resolving those issues. Id.
"In either case such persons assume special
prominence in the resolution of public questions." Id.
133 Id.; see, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 n.5 (1988) (inferring that the
Reverend Jerry Falwell was an all purpose public figure because he hosted a nationally syndicated
radio show, was the head of a political organization known as the Moral Majority, and was listed in
the Who's Who in America); see also DOBBS, supra note 91, § 418 (highlighting the attributes of an
all-purpose public figure).
'13 Gertz, 418 U.S at 345 ("[Limited] public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved").
135 Id. at 351 (noting a limited public figure may be drawn into a particular public controversy).
136 Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[Limited] public figures
effectively have assumed the risk of potentially unfair criticism by entering into the public arena
and engaging the public's attention.").
137See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. In discussing that the actual malice standard does not apply to
private citizens, the Court expounded on the two types of public figures.
138 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
139 See id. at 387-88 ("We hold that the constitutional protections for speech ... to redress false
reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published the report
with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.").
140 See DOBBS, supra note 91, § 428. The four elements needed for a false light tort are:
(a) the defendant publicized a matter about the plaintiff to a substantial group of
persons or to the public;
(b) the matter put the plaintiff in a false light;
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family. 141 The Hills became famous when they were held captive by three escaped
convicts. 142 Their story was so endearing to public that a play was based on their
terrible ordeal. 143 However, the play incorrectly portrayed the fugitives as violent,
and even had them molesting the family. 144 In actuality, the convicts were courteous
145
to the Hills.
The Court applied the actual malice standard, created in New York Times, to
the false light claim because it felt this was a public issue that deserved protection
under the First Amendment. 146 The Court noted that a false light claim was similar
to a libel claim because both actions dealt with falsities. 147 Consequently, the actual
malice standard is now applied to false light claims involving newsworthy stories.
The actual malice standard has also been used in the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress ("IED"). In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,148 the
hardcore pornographic magazine published a parody advertisement involving the
Reverend Jerry Falwell. 149 The parody had Falwell discussing how he lost his
virginity to his mother. 150 Falwell brought a libel, invasion of privacy, and an IIED
claim against Hustler magazine. 151 The Western District of Virginia gave a directed
verdict in Hustler's favor in regard to the invasion of privacy, and the jury
152
determined there was no libel because Hustler did not act with actual malice.
However, the jury did award Falwell damages for his IIED claim, which the Fourth
153
Circuit of the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed on appeal, 154 holding that political and public
debate should not be restrained simply because Falwell was emotionally
(c) the false light would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and
(d) the defendant knew of the falsity or acted in reckless disregard whether the
matter was false or not.
Id. The false light claim differs from defamation because the false light does have to be
defamatory, but rather only offensive. Id
141

Time Inc., 385 U.S. at 376-77.

142 Id.
143
144

at 378.

Id. at 377.
Id. at 378. ("[The Hills] stressed the convicts had treated the family courteously, had not

molested them, and had not been at all violent.").
145 Id.
146 Id. at 386-87, 388. The Court stated "[t]hree years ago Americans all over the country read
about the desperate ordeal of the James Hill family, who were held prisoners in their home outside
Philadelphia by three escaped convicts." Id. at 377. Furthermore, this new story was in the public
interest. Id. at 386.
147 See id. at 396 (rationalizing "'fictionalization' was synonymous to 'falsity').
148 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
14) Id. at 48. The November issue of Hustler featured a parody advertisement for Campari
Liqueur, where the Reverend Jerry Falwell was featured. Id
The parody contained a mock
interview with Falwell, which portrays him as drunk and him having a sexual encounter with his
mother. Id. The parody advertisement did contain the following disclaimer on the bottom: "ad
parody-not to be taken seriously." Id
1510See id.
151Id.
152 Id. at 48, 57.
153 Falwell. v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1275, 76 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'dsub nom. Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S 46 (1988).
154 HustlerMagazine,Inc., 485 U.S. at 57.
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distressed. 15 5 Accordingly, the Court espoused that First Amendment principles and
the actual malice standard are required when a public figure or official makes an
IED claim. 15 6 Indeed, the actual malice standard encourages public debate involving
public figures. 15 7 Ultimately, Falwell did not prevail because the jury did not find
15 8
actual malice due to the unbelievable nature of the parody.
In summary, defamation in general, and libel in particular, protect an
individual's reputation. One's reputation is important to one's liberty. 159 These
principles are similar to the principles of moral rights, but have had the time to be
further developed. This development resulted in the adoption of the actual malice
standard. This standard shifts the burden to the plaintiff and requires him to prove
the statements at issue were made by a defendant who knew them to be false, or
made them with a reckless disregard for the truth. This encourages debate on the
public officials and figures who shape our society. In addition, it does not impose an
undue burden on public people because they knowingly subject themselves to
criticism and have the power to easily refute any defamatory statements.
The relationship between moral rights and fair use is important to understand.
Moral rights give an artist a personal interest in her works. Fair use is an
affirmative defense to moral rights, and allows the dissemination of information that
is in the public's interest. The actual malice standard can maintain the differing
goals of both moral rights and fair use without hindering either.

II.

DETERMINING THE CONGRUENCY BETWEEN DEFAMATION, MORAL RIGHTS, AND FAIR

USE.

The application of the actual malice standard to moral rights serves as a wedge
between the fair use/moral rights conflict. It allows for the interests of both fair use
and moral rights to thrive, without offending either one. However, a careful analysis
is required to effectively balance the two doctrines.
The following section analyzes the similarities between moral rights and the
actual malice standard. The first part evaluates whether an artist is a public figure,
which is necessary for the application of actual malice. The second part dissects
whether the actual malice standard is appropriate for moral rights. The third part
discusses how the actual malice standard does not alter the purposes of fair use, but
rather promotes it.
155 Id. at 51. The Court specifically turned to NY Times in its analysis. Indeed, it stated that
'public figures as well as public officials will be subject to 'vehehment, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks."' Id. (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
Further, the Court espouses statements made with actual malice can only give "'breathing space' to
the freedoms protected by the FirstAmendment." Id. at 52, 56.
156 Id. at 56.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 57.
159 See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) ("The right of a man to the protection of his
own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept
of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system
of ordered liberty.") (Stewart, J., concurring).
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A. The Portraitof the Artist as a Public Figure
It is necessary to show that the artist is a public figure in order to apply the
actual malice standard to a moral rights violation. New York Times and its progeny
incorporated First Amendment protections into the actual malice standard when
speech involves a public person. 160 Hustler,reevaluated this policy and affirmed it by
161
applying the actual malice standard to IIED claims made by a public person.
The similarities between a public figure and an artist are quite apparent. Like a
public figure, an artist knowingly accepts public discussion and criticism when she
submits her work into the public arena. 162 This is true even when the criticism is
harsh or unfair. 163 Moreover, the work is often put into the public arena to encourage
164
open debate, further substantiating the claim that an artist is a public figure.

B.

True or False?:"The Actual Malice Standardis Appropriatefor a MoralRights
Viola tion

New York Times raised the bar for a public official to recover from defamation.
As noted before, the actual malice standard places the burden of proof on the
plaintiff, requiring him to show that the defendant knowingly made false statements
or acted with a reckless disregard for the truth.165 Admittedly, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged this standard still allows for some false speech because of the
difficulty involved in proving the actual malice standard. 166 It is appropriate under
the principles of the First Amendment to allow for some false statements to permeate
because the actual malice standard is designed not to preclude truthful speech. 167 In

160 See Harte-Hanks Commc'ns v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 659 (1989); N Y Times Co., 376
U.S. at 279-80.
161 See HustlerMagazine,Inc., 485 U.S. at 56.
162 See, Kathryn A. Kelly, MoralRights and the FirstAmendment.* PuttingHonorBefore Free
Speech? 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 211, 212 (1994) ("Artists' reputations and honor are
also at stake whenever they submit their work for public inspection.").
16: Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[P]ublic figures
effectively have assumed the risk of potentially unfair criticism by entering into the public arena
and engaging the public's attention."); see Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public
Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103
HARv. L. REV. 603, 627 (1990). The policy that authors of public works should expect unfair and
defamatory criticism dates back to the early 19th Century case involving the "fair comment"
privilege. Id. There, the author could not recover from a defamation claim because "[e]very man
who publishes a book commits himself to the judgment of the public." Id. (citing Carr v. Hood, 170
Eng. Rep. 983 (1808)).
161 Steak Unlimited,Inc., 623 F.2d at 273; Kelly, supra note 162, at 212.
1651
NY. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; Harte-Hanks Commens, 491 U.S. at 659.
166 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) ("Plainly many deserving plaintiffs,
including some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of the New
York Times test.").
107 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 ("The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in
order to protect speech that matters").
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short, the essence of the actual malice standard is falsity. 168 Falsity occurs when a
169
speaker knowingly makes a false statement.
The Fourth Circuit questioned whether falsity was needed to determine actual
1 70
malice in IIED actions involving public figures. The court in Falwell v. Fynt,
acknowledged that while actual malice was needed, falsity should not play a part
because falsity is not an element of IIED.1 71 The court felt including falsity would
drastically alter the nature of an IIED claim. 172 On appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed and stated that any application of the actual malice standard required an
evaluation of falsity.1 73 The Court felt that preserving First Amendment free speech
174
rights was more important than maintaining the integrity of an IED claim.
Hustler is important because it stands for the proposition that falsity must be
evaluated even if it is not relevant to the cause of action. The cause of action may not
require falsity, but it still must be addressed in determining whether actual malice
occurred.
New York Times, which was reaffirmed in Hustler, indicates that speech
involving public figures requires falsity in determining actual malice.1 75 This
development weighs in favor of the application of the actual malice standard to a
moral rights violation. Indeed, a moral rights violation occurs when either the artist
is falsely attributed to a work she did not create, or when a work is altered such that
17 6
it falsely represents how the work was intended to be shown.
Another similarity between moral rights and the actual malice standard is the
principle that a public person's reputation must be protected. Indeed, actual malice
still protects public people from defamatory falsehoods that damage their
reputation.17 7 Further, the rule recognizes this reputational interest: "[t]he right of
a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful
168 See St. Amant v. Thompson 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
169Seo 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3.10 (2d ed. 2008) (stating falsity is
implicit to the actual malice standard).
170 797 F.2d 1270 (1986), rev'd sub nom. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S 46 (1988).
171 Id. at 1274-75 (discussing IIED's fault standard is not based on falsity, thus the N Y Times
standard for actual malice should not apply, because IIED is based on the "defendant's intentional
or reckless misconduct has proximately caused the injury").
172 Id. at 1275 ("Requiring a plaintiff to prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the
truth in an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress would add a new element to this
tort, and alter its nature.").
173 Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 56-57 ("[P]ublic figures and public officials may not
recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress ... without showing in addition
that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with 'actual malice').
174 See id. at 50-56. The court emphasized the First Amendment recognizes "the fundamental
importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern." Id. at
50. In addition, " [t]he freedom to speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty.., but
also is essential to the common quest for truth and vitality of society as a whole." Id. at 51. Further,
there should be robust debate involving public figures. Id.
175Id. at 56.
Consequently, the actual malice standard "is necessary to give adequate
'breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the FirstAmendment." Td. at 56.
17617 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a)(1)-(3) (2006); see also Roeder, supra note 9, at 569 (presenting a work
that is not the artist's own makes "him subject to criticism for work he has not done").
177 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding a public official may
recover from defamation if she can prove actual malice).
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hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of
l8
every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.'
Moral rights involve personal rights. Indeed, the right of attribution and
integrity protect the personality, soul, and spirit that an artist puts into her work.179
Consequently, a violation of either of these rights directly tarnishes the artist's honor
and reputation. Accordingly, the application of the actual malice standard to moral
rights is appropriate.
In conclusion, the actual malice standard does not offend the purposes and
interests of moral rights. First, both deal with actions that involve falsities. Second,
the actual malice standard shares a common goal with moral rights, which is to
protect reputation from falsehoods. Therefore, applying the actual malice standard
to moral rights iswell founded because both are in agreement.

C. Whether the Aetua] Malice Standardis a Fair Use for Fair Use?
In addition to upholding the principles of moral rights, the actual malice
standard also sustains the policies of fair use. Both the actual malice standard and
180
fair use promote the necessary dissemination of speech needed for public discourse.
This section analyzes how the First Amendment is implicated by both and, therefore,
further suggests that the actual malice standard should be applied to moral rights
when there is a fair use defense.
As stated earlier, New York Times removed the strict liability aspect of
defamation when speech involved public figures, and shifted the burden of proof to
the plaintiff.1 8 1 This change encouraged "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate
about public officials that otherwise would have been restrained.18 2 Moving the
burden of proof to the plaintiff makes the defendant's speech less actionable.
Naturally, less legal apprehension means less self-censorship and more statements
being made.18 3 In effect, the more statements or speech that enter the public sphere
the better, because a more informed public "[brings] about [the] political and social
changes desired by the people."1 8 4 This is the heart of the First Amendment.
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
supra note 13, at 801.
180 Compare N Y Times, 376 U.S. at 279 (placing the burden of the statement's truth on the
defendant leads to "self-censorship" of criticism regarding public officials, because the defendant
may believe it is too difficult to prove he is telling the truth), with Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance,
Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating public discourse is not stifled by the copyright owner
because fair use "facilitate[s] criticism of copyrighted works by enabling the critic to quote enough of
the criticized work to make his criticisms intelligible" without fear of liability), and NIMMER, supra
note 12, § 19E.02[A][1] (stating fair use allows "for the creation and maintenance of a robust public
discourse").
181 Harte-Hanks Commc'ns v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 659 (1989).
182 N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 270 ("[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials.").
183 See id. at 279 (stating having a defendant proving truth in libel leads to self-censorship
because the burden of proof may deter true speech from being disseminated).
184 Id.
at 269 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
Further, "[t]he
maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be
178

179 Lee,
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Similarly, fair use promotes the dissemination of ideas and knowledge to the
public that copyright owners and artists could otherwise restrict.lS 5 In essence,
without fair use, the copyright owner would be able to "maintain a monopoly of
sentiment and opinion" in regard to her work.18 6 This power would enable an author
to block negative commentary or criticism and completely avoid the principles of the
First Amendment. In other words, the artist would control public debate and dictate
how her work will be evaluated. Fair use remedies this abuse and allows for more
speech involving the work to be disseminated without fear of liability or
restriction.18 7 This is consistent with the First Amendment and comparable to the
ideals of the actual malice standard.
Another similarity between the actual malice standard and fair use is the aspect
of falsity. As demonstrated above, and in Hustler, falsity is always an aspect of
actual malice, even if it is not implicated in the cause of action.18 8 Therefore, the only
question is whether fair use involves falsity. Admittedly, the four factors for
determining fair use do not expressly mention falsity.18 9 However, the fourth factor,
which deals with "the [new work's] effect... upon the potential market ... value of
the copyrighted work," has implicated falsity as a consideration. 190 In Campbell, the
Supreme Court discussed whether a rap parody of Roy Orbison's Pretty Woman
harmed the potential market for Orbison's song. 191 The Court stated the parody
could be a legitimate fair use even though it generated negative criticism because the
market harm was not unreasonable. 192 It was not unreasonable because Orbison
created his work knowing such criticisms may arise. Arguably, the fact that the
Court looked at the legitimacy of the market harm suggests that truthful criticism or
commentary is indicative of fair use, while false criticism is not. Even though the
other fair use factors must still be considered, it can nonetheless be argued that

responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an
opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional
system." -d. (citing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
185 NIMMER, supra note 12, § 19E.02[A][1].
186 Post, supra note163, at 627 (citing Carr v. Hood, 170 Eng. Rep. 983 (1808)).
187 See NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 486 (2d Cir. 2004) (Jacobs, J., concurring). If
good faith, or state of mind is a factor in fair use then, "[i]ncremental risks drive up the cost of
publication, thus the prudent publisher may elect to forgo a new work altogether if the good faith of
the creator cannot be assured." ITd. Consequently, the benefits derived from fair use will be lost to
the public. Id. at 485-86.
188 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988) (recognizing that IIED
involves a party's intent, but a party's bad motive cannot be reconciled with the First Amendment's
promotion of public debate about public figures).
189 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
190iTd. § 107(4).
191Campbell v. Acruff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590-94 (1994).
192 Id. at 591-92. The Court stated that "a parody may not harm the market at all, but when a
lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the original, it does not produce a
harm cognizable under the Copyright Act." Id. More specifically, the Court stated its role "is to
distinguish between 'biting criticism [that merely] suppresses demand [and] copyright
infringement[, which] usurps it."' _Td. at 592 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir 1986)
(alterations in original)).
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falsity is implicated in deciding fair use. 193 Accordingly, this demonstrates another
similarity between the actual malice standard and fair use.
In total, both fair use and the actual malice standard encourage the
dissemination of information to the public. In addition, the requirement of falsity for
actual malice does not antagonize fair use. Indeed, falsity could be a consideration in
fair use's fourth factor. As a result, the actual malice standard and fair use can
coexist without conflict.
Overall, this section analyzed how an actual malice standard would affect
artists, moral rights, and fair use. Consequently, a visual artist is a public figure,
thus any speech involving her should not be actionable unless there is actual malice.
Next, the actual malice standard prevents falsehoods that harm reputation.
Similarly, moral rights prevent falsities that also damage reputation. Hence, the
application of the actual malice standard to a moral rights violation is appropriate.
Finally, the actual malice standard and fair use's promotion of public debate are
tantamount. Moreover, fair use recognizes an aspect falsity. Therefore, the actual
malice standard does not completely oppose fair use.

III. PAINTING THE PICTURE WITH THE DELICATE BRUSH OF THE ACTUAL MALICE
STANDARD - VARA AND FAIR USE WILL NOT BE DISTORTED
The application of the actual malice standard in asserting a fair use defense to a
moral rights violation is appropriate because it allows for the purposes of moral
rights and fair use to thrive, without either being sacrificed. In essence, the actual
malice standard serves as a bridge whereby the differences between moral rights and
fair use can be reconciled. The first section reaffirms the actual malice standard
should apply because it has similar policies in common with moral rights and fair
use. The second section discusses the concerns that arise when applying the actual
malice standard to fair use. The last section describes a proposed test.

A. Actual Malice is Appropriate
The application of the actual malice standard to fair use is appropriate because
it takes in account both the values of moral rights and the importance of public
debate. As demonstrated above, actual malice applies when speech is made against
public people. Consequently, the actual malice standard should apply to fair use
because an artist, like a public figure, opens herself to criticism. Further, the actual
malice standard recognizes that reputation is still a valid interest for public figures
or officials and provides suitable protection. Similarly, moral rights are designed to
protect the artist's reputation. At the same time, the actual malice standard does not

193 Cf Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees/Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers v. BUCI Television, Inc., 118
F. Supp. 2d 126, 129 (D. Mass. 2000). The plaintiff claimed the Boston GloWs use of his
copyrighted video was for a smear campaign, and did not constitute fair use. Td. at 127, 128-29.
However, the court stated that the plaintiffs argument only considered one of the fair use factors,
and that the other factors indicated fair use. Id. at 129-30.
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sidestep the importance of fair use. The burden shifting mechanism of the actual
malice standard promotes the dissemination of information. Further, this precludes
false commentary and criticism from entering the public sphere. Coincidently, this is
consistent with the goals of fair use. The essence of fair use is to promote public
discourse that would otherwise be restrained. The congruency of the actual malice
standard, moral rights, and fair use makes it practical to apply. In sum, the actual
malice standard upholds the values of both moral rights and fair use and allows for
the court to fairly consider the principles behind the two philosophies.

B. Concerns ofApplying the Actual Malice Standard
There are a few concerns that need to be addressed in using the actual malice
standard with fair use and moral rights. The first is that the actual malice standard
would apply a bad faith analysis. This is a concern because "[bad faith is a slippery
concept in the copyright context. It () is difficult to define, (ii) may be impossible to
detect, and (iii) given weight, may lead to the suppression of transformative works
that are valuable to the expansion of public knowledge." 194 Simply put, bad faith or
motive is not a requirement of actual malice. 195 Actual malice only requires that a
person knowingly made false statements, or had a reckless disregard for the truth.
However, some critics will say bad faith is implicit in the determination of falsity.
This argument carries little weight because the Supreme Court addressed this
concern in Hustler Magazine. There, Larry Flynt, the owner of Hustler, created a
parody ad which suggested the Reverend Jerry Falwell lost his virginity to his
mother.196 In his deposition, Flynt said his purposes for the parody were to upset
Falwell, by showing he was a glutton, a liar, a hypocrite, and to assassinate Falwell's
integrity.1 97 Despite Flynt's bad intentions, the Supreme Court ruled that bad
motive should not preclude speech involving public figures; instead, the falsity of the
statement was at issue, not the motive behind the statement. 198 Accordingly, this
case shows that the speaker's intentions are irrelevant in determining actual malice.
NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 486 (2d Cir. 2004) (Jacobs, J., concurring).
195 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964). The Court Stated:
Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk
that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out
of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas
and the ascertainment of truth. Under a rule like the Louisiana rule, permitting
a finding of malice based on an intent merely to inflict harm, rather than an
intent to inflict harm through falsehood, "it becomes a hazardous matter to speak
out against a popular politician, with the result that the dishonest and
incompetent will be shielded."
Id. (citation omitted).
196Falwell v. Flynt, F.2d 1270, 1272 (1986), rev'd sub nom. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S 46 (1988).
194

197Id. at 1273.

198 Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 53, 56 (1988).
The Court stated how the First
Amendment supersedes tort liability in the area of public debate on public figures: "Thus while such
a bad motive may be deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law, we
think the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate about public figures."
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The next concern is that the actual malice standard applies an unnecessary
examination of the defendant's state of mind. Proponents of this argument may
argue such an examination goes against fair use. Critics may believe authors of new
works would be fearful that their benevolent state of mind could not be assured, and
would rather choose not to create new works than risk a lawsuit. 199 This is a valid
concern because less works mean less dissemination of information and knowledge
that is needed for society.
The actual malice standard is a difficult standard to prove. Indeed, the plaintiff
holds the burden of showing actual malice occurred with clear and convincing
evidence. 20 0 Further, the plaintiff must show, subjectively, that the new author made
knowingly false statements, or did so with a reckless disregard for the truth. These
factors mitigate the risks associated with a state of mind requirement being applied
to fair use and make it more difficult to defeat the fair use defense. In fact, actual
malice does not prohibit fair use; it just makes it more effective because it only
prohibits fair use done with falsity. This is consistent with the principles of fair use
because now the dissemination of information that would otherwise be tainted with
falsity will not enter and infect the public sphere. Thus, these proponents should
welcome the actual malice standard to fair use because it promotes healthy public
discourse.
Overall, applying the actual malice standard to fair use, when asserted as a
defense to moral rights, is not without concerns. Even though these concerns raise
critical issues, the nature and development of the actual malice standard alleviates
these problems through burden shifting and heightening the evidentiary standard.
In fact, the actual malice standard makes fair use more efficient by precluding fair
use done with falsity. This counters the critics' notion that an evaluation of state of
mind would restrain the benefits derived from fair use. 20 1 Consequently, because the
actual malice standard pairs well with both fair use and moral rights the core values
of each are not only sustained but also promoted. Thus the concerns of critics are
rendered trivial.

C A FinalLook at the ProposedTest.
As stated previously in this section, the actual malice standard allows an artist
to recover from a violation of her moral rights when the defendant's fair use was
knowingly false, or done with the reckless disregard for the truth. The test below
shows how an artist can recover without fair use being trampled.

Id. Consequently, the Court held the actual malice standard applies to public figures making IED
claims. Id. at 56.
199NXIVM Colp, 364 F. 3d at 486.
200 Harte-Hanks Comme'ns v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 659 (1989).
201
See NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 485-86.
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1. The DefendantMust Disprove the Plaintiffis a Public Figure
Before the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff, the defendant has the
opportunity to show that the artist is not a public figure. This is critical because the
actual malice standard only applies to public figures or officials. 20 2 Implicitly, fair
use involves criticism or commentary about the plaintiffs work, and because the
plaintiff submits this work for public discourse, the plaintiff is essentially a limited
public figure. Consequently, it must be presumed the plaintiff is a public figure. It is
more likely than not that an artist will be a public figure. Like politicians and
celebrities, artists knowingly enter the public sphere and submit their work to
influence society, or at the very least the art world. Further, it is very likely an artist
would have the means or access to minimize the damages to her reputation.
However, if the defendant can show his new work is not within the scope of the
plaintiffs public persona then the plaintiff is not a limited public figure. Thus, fair
use prevails against moral rights. Again, it should be noted that being a public
figure is a critical ingredient to the actual malice standard because actual malice
only protects public debate on public officials or figures. 20 3
Therefore, the
presumption that the plaintiff is a public figure is appropriate. As a result, actual
malice applies.

2. Passing the Burden Back - The PlaintiffMust Show Fair Use Was Committed
With Actual Malice
Actual malice shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff and requires the plaintiff
to show with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's new work was made
with actual malice. 20 4 Thus, the defendant's absolute defense of fair use fails. Again,
actual malice dictates that the defendant knew the fair use was false, or committed
with reckless disregard for the truth. 20 5 A statement is "knowingly" false if the new
author had a "high degree of awareness . . . of probable falsity." 20 6 In addition,
recklessness can be shown if the new author entertained serious doubts about the
truth. 20 7 The actual malice standard requires subjective proof that the defendant
committed actual malice, not objective proof that a reasonable person would have
committed actual malice. 208 This allows for a plaintiff to recover when fair use is
knowingly committed with falsity. Consequently the plaintiffs reputation and honor
can now be protected.
At the same time, this standard does not disregard the fundamentals of fair use.
Defendants can still create new works under fair use, just as long as they made them
202 See Harte-Hanks Comme'ns, 491 U.S. at 659; Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 56; N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
203 See Harte-Hanks Comme'ns, 491 U.S. at 659; Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 56; NY
Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80.
204 Harte-Hanks Commen,491 U.S. at 659.
205 N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80.
206 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
207 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
208 See id.
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without committing falsity. Because actual malice requires a rigorous showing the
defendant will not be hesitant in creating new works. Thus, the actual malice
standard promotes fair use by only blocking works made with actual malice.
Overall, this test should be accepted by both the proponents of moral rights and
fair use. Without such a test, a fair use defense absolutely prevents an artist to
recover from a moral rights violation. Now, when fair use is committed with actual
malice, an artist's moral rights can prevail. This is not unfair to fair use. Indeed, the
actual malice standard precludes works committed with falsity from entering the
public arena, which is the ultimate goal of fair use. Even the most stringent of fair
use proponents could not condone works that are riddled with falsity. Accordingly,
the application of the actual malice standard allows for moral rights and fair use to
coexist.

CONCLUSION

Under the current standard, Picasso's estate would not be able to recover if a
party took Picasso's Guernica and painted the word "lies" all over the canvas. Thus,
his legacy would be injured and his honor and reputation would be damaged. By
applying an actual malice standard, the estate could save his honor because it gives
the estate the power to recover from such false attributions or representations of his
work. At the same time, the actual malice standard still provides for truthful works
derived from fair use to contribute to the overall discussion of Picasso and his work
and, thus, does not completely override the ideas of fair use. Therefore, artworks not
of the same magnitude or importance of Guerniea can be protected with the actual
malice standard.
The United States historical reluctance of incorporating moral rights should not
overshadow the importance protecting an artist's honor and reputation.
Furthermore, such interests should not be unilaterally denied when fair use is
involved. This country's rich development of defamation law in general, and libel law
in particular, carries goals similar to those as moral rights and fair use. Accordingly,
the adoption of the actual malice standard to both fair use and moral rights allows
for the honor and reputation of artists to be protected without sacrificing new works
needed to foster public debate.

